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It is a remarkable and puzzling fact that, for over a century, psychological and biological 
research have been exploring the development and functional characterization of brain/mind 
activity in almost totally separate and non-interactive ways. It cannot be denied, however, 
that the human brain is the result of evolution in the brains of other mammals. The 
subcortical structures of mammals present anatomical, neurochemical and functional 
homologies, and these suggest largely similar mechanisms for emotion, perception and 
action. One of the reasons for the lack of concern by experimental psychologists with 
biological issues may derive from a premature, and thus largely sterile, nature-nurture 
controversy. While it was difficult in the recent past to understand how genes might interact 
with the environment in expressing themselves, the notion of epigenetic development is now 
better understood in its precise mechanisms, although much remains to be discovered.1 The 
nature-nurture controversy, however, has overshadowed other important points. Even if it is 
recognized that human behavior largely results from individual and socio-historical 
interaction with the environment, such interactions can hardly be understood if the general 
constraints that the species confronts, given its bodily structure, general needs, and physical-
social environment, fail to be grasped. 
In order to approach the notion of a psychological (or mental) function in a principled 
manner, we need to understand, in general terms, what a mental function is, and how it 
relates to brain evolution. To achieve this, we will first need to summarize how teleological 
discourse has been « naturalized », i.e. how functional explanation has been defined in 
purely causal terms (section 1). We will also need to characterize how mental functions 
differ from other organic functions, and consider the causal constraints that are exerted over 
evolutionary time on this type of function (sections 2-4). In order to discuss this issue, 
however, we will first have to examine the respective roles of genes and development in 
regulating adult cognition, and determine the correct methodology to use in addressing the 
                                                
1 See Oyama (2000), Jaenisch & Bird, (2003). 
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question of mental function. Various definitions of mental function correspond to different 
methodological viewpoints, that we will discuss successively: Evolutionary Psychology2 and 
its modular approach to function, Evo-devo and the idea of a developmental view of 
function, and neurocognitive theories, with their notion that neural growth determines 
function. The goal of this paper is to define the concept of a “mental function” that meets the 
general constraints that apply to the concept of a biological function. Its ultimate aims are to 
understand how psychology as a theoretical field is articulated with biology, and identify 
which methodological requirements are entailed by this articulation.  
 
1 – The concept of function 
 
We say that a structure of type X in species S has function F, when the following three 
conditions are fulfilled: 
(1) Structures of type X in species S typically produce F in inclusive context C. 
(2) Structures of Type X are inheritable or reproducible. 
(3) Structures of type X exist because they have adaptive value (because those 
organisms that have produced F thanks to X in the corresponding inclusive 
context have been/are more likely to reproduce than those that have not).  
There are three different causal relations involved in our definition of “function”. The 
first is the idea of a causal disposition, that is a mechanism that tends (or used to tend) to 
produce a given consequence. For example, a muscle tends to contract, a property that has 
many possible usages, from pumping in or out, to locomotion and prehension. The second is 
a reproductive mechanism, that allows the device in question to be “copied” or emulated 
either in the same organism (for further use) or in its offspring. The causal mechanism here 
does not need to be specified: it ranges from genetic reproduction to epigenetically 
stabilized features, (as with muscles), learning and cultural scaffolding (as with mindreading 
or planning). The third causal relation is the crux of the dynamic-causal explanation of 
function, through the notion of heightened fitness: the device in question has been selected, 
reproduced and/or is presently used because it gives the organism a better chance for 
survival, through the precise effect it produces in the relevant context.  
This causal condition is sometimes seen as a “historical” form of causality; but actually, 
things are more complicated. It can be interpreted either in retrospective, historical terms, as 
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the “etiological view” of function recommends, or in dispositional, time-neutral terms, as 
the propensionist view suggests.3 We will not discuss here the merits of these 
interpretations, which correspond to the respective needs of evolutionary biologists 
(interested in the evolutionary history of traits) and of anatomo-physiologists (interested in 
the causal role of a functional element) as well as to what Mayr called 'functional biology'.4 
Suffice it to say that this third causal link is a form of causation by consequences immersed 
in a recurrent selective process. For our present discussion, conditions 1 and 2 need to be 
spelled out in more detail.  
 
 
A – Inclusive context 
The notion of an inclusive context, introduced in condition 1, is a very important factor that 
modulates what is called “the categorical basis” of the corresponding disposition. Context is 
not only the background in which a function operates, it plays a structuring causal role in the 
functional effect. It is simple to see why. A physical (or biophysical) disposition owes its 
causal capacity to there being nomic relations between properties engaged by the disposition 
and the environment in which it is exerted. For a substance to be soluble in water, water is 
not needed: as a pure possibility, the disposition is relational and context-independent. For 
this disposition to be exercised however, the substance must actually be plunged into water.  
If the contexts of a functional device are sufficiently modified, the corresponding disposition 
fails to be convertible in a causal process.  
Moreover, given that the structure, in virtue of condition 2, needs to be reproducible in 
new organisms to count as a functional item, context needs to be stable at least in its 
causally crucial dimensions, to allow the structure to reliably produce its effects. Context 
interacts with function in two different ways, i.e. according to two types of constraints (By 
“constraints”, are meant the contextual conditions that have to be present for a given 
functional disposition to be exercised). There are two kinds of such causal constraints that a 
device must satisfy to produce a functional effect F. These constraints have to do 
respectively with the external or internal context in which the device operates.  
 External context constraints are the nomic biophysical relations that allow the energy 
flow between the device and the relevant part of the environment. Let us consider two 
                                                                                                                                              
the general field (referred to by the same, non-capitalized, term). 
3 See Proust (1997) for a defense of the propensionist account. 
4 See in Mayr (1961/1988), ‘Cause and Effect in Biology’, 24-37. 
4 
examples. 1) A muscle contracts in given conditions of gravity. Actually gravity causally 
contributes to the development and operation of muscles (Thelen & Smith, 1994). 2) Social 
learning occurs in given conditions of appropriate social, communicational and emotional 
environment, etc. The kind of feedback that the system receives about the type of social 
relations, and the value of these relations to itself, is causally crucial for learning to occur.  
Internal context constraints are the relations between the functional device producing 
F and the other functional subsystems of the organism with which the structure producing F 
interacts in order to produce F. For example, a muscle works in relation with other 
functional elements: the skeleton dictates the shape and location of the tendons and of the 
skeletal muscles, which are themselves involved in moving various body segments 
according to the various demands of motor tasks.  Learning how to read minds presupposes 
a hierarchy of other mental capacities. To read a mind, you need (inter alia) to have 
conceptual-inferential ability, a linguistic ability including syntax and a semantics for mental 
states, and an evolved ability to teach and to learn. For any function, there are upstream - or 
precursor  - functional elements that need to be present for the function to be assembled or 
exercised (downstream functions will also in turn depend on it to develop, but they do not 
constitute a constraint for their precursor). Bill Wimsatt has theorized this functional 
asymmetry in terms of a relation of generative entrenchment between a functional effect and 
the preconditions that make its development and normal operation possible.5  The solidarity 
at any given time between the various elements contributing to the F effect is what allows us 
to speak of a “system”, such as the musculo-skeletal system, or the mindreading system. 
B – Reproducibility 
The second important aspect of our definition has to do with the concept of reproducibility 
or inheritability. For evolution by natural selection to occur, the variants that, in a given 
population and environment, increase their bearers'fitness must be heritable traits. The 
concept of function, being part of a fitness-based selective reproductive process, involves the 
intervention of a reproductive device. Quite obviously, one important process that underlies 
this transmission is the genetic mechanisms of reproduction. Transmitting human hearts 
(normally) presupposes sexual reproduction. There are however also non-genetic 
mechanisms that contribute to the recurrence of a functional trait. Some are environmental – 
such as those ecological parameters that control development, motivation and growth in 
similar ways in various individuals. Some, and probably most, are cultural – such as the vast 
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number of learning practices that permanently “reproduce” specific skills and associated 
tools in new brains - and hands; linguistic communication that creates new tokens of a 
thought pattern in new individuals; bodily communication that creates new expressive 
means in the recipients; various prosthetic technologies allowing artifacts “resembling” the 
dysfunctional structure that is to be replaced or otherwise repaired and/or enhanced in order 
to maintain the organism’s life.  These various kinds of examples are meant to underscore 
that no identity or exact duplication is required by condition 2.6  Every case of transmission 
has to allow for contingent developmental accidents as well as for interfering stable dynamic 
patterns that may modify the outcome. We will see later, however, that such variance is a 
welcome feature that can be exploited and monitored in a dynamic system. 
 
C- The causal-teleological condition 
We will not comment in detail on condition 3, which has been discussed at length in 
heated debates among evolutionary biologists. Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin 
have ridiculed the “Panglossian” tendency of adaptationists to identify each single organic 
feature as a functional trait, much like the Leibnizian Pangloss of Voltaire’s Candide. Their 
objections to an oversimplified application of the concept of function are well taken and are 
devastating for the naive teleologist that is dormant in us. In order to apply condition 3, as 
they are right to insist, it must be shown that no other explanation is at hand than the 
causation-by-consequence explanation (other explanations include developmental or 
architectural constraints that cannot fail to apply –and thus do not need to be “selected” -, or 
'non-selective' genetic explanations, like genetic drift). A methodological recommendation 
follows about applying condition 3 in a parsimonious manner: no function should be 
attributed without documentation of a relevant selective history. This kind of consideration 
motivates the next question we want to raise. 
  
 
2 – Mental function: the modular view 
 
                                                
6 Dawkins’meme theory claims that ideas are identically replicated from brain to brain, and 
undergo a quasi-darwinian selective process comparable to genes. Sperber’s epidemiology 
of representation, however, does not postulate that a copying process is involved. Rather, 
there is repeated production by the recipients’own informational processes, which allows 
variants of the same type to be generated by the same epidemiological process. See 
Sperber (2006). 
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Having provided a general definition of what a function is, we now need to find the 
specific difference that will allow us to focus on mental functions. What are the features that 
make an organic function a mental one? In other terms, what is the disposition (or set of 
dispositions) that can be copied or reproduced such that having it would allow a system to 
develop capacities of a mental type (condition 1)?   What are the general constraints – internal 
or external – that apply to them? What are the specific “copying” or  “reproductive” 
mechanisms that implement them (condition 2)? And how do the consequences of the 
disposition about fitness explain that the mental disposition is adaptive, i.e. has been selected  
(condition 3)? In sum, are we in a position to identify mental functions? 
 
Although the concept of a function is of common use in psychology and in cognitive 
science, experimental psychologists have rarely addressed these three questions in any 
systematic way. It is often observed that experimental psychologists studying a capacity in 
mature adults rarely attempt to understand the development and full scope of the capacity 
they are studying. They are aiming to characterize behavioral regularities, not to question 
the way they were established, which functions they have outside the lab, and which 
neuronal systems realize them. Although there are, as we shall see below, deep reasons for 
“functional agnosticism”, there are also more shallow ones. The functional terms used in 
experimental psychology, such as “perception”, “working memory”, “motivation”, etc. are 
used to characterize, in broad functional terms, systems of informational processing 
mechanisms that are logically required, given basic assumptions on what a mind should be. 
The term function is used to refer to a causal role in a set of informational processes 
relating input and output.  Although this usage is prima facie pragmatically sufficient to 
conduct experiments and theorize about the mind, it cannot provide a foundation for 
psychology as a science; far more is required than a broad causal role “to cut nature at its 
joints”: the problem with these causal attributions is that both the stimuli and the responses 
are classified in terms of commonsensical, rather than causally relevant, “natural kinds”; 
they actually fail to be robustly involved in the functional roles that they are supposed to 
have (for example, it is debatable that there is such thing as “visual perception” in any 
strict sense of the term, given the multimodal organization of the perceptual system in 
mammals).  
It may be worth emphasizing that this use of the term “function” did not originate in 
biology, but rather in rational taxonomy, which from Aristotle on has decomposed the 
mind into general, wide purpose ‘faculties’: perception has the purpose of extracting 
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information (perceiving), memory helps store and retrieve it (learning, remembering), 
motivation allows wanting, acting is the faculty of converting knowledge into goal-directed 
behaviors, and emoting allows one to create social bonds and to communicate. The various 
dispositions cited as constituting a mind fail to qualify as biological functions, however, as 
long as they are not justified by the type of reasoning we have sketched above: no internal 
or external constraints are investigated concerning how the disposition is supposed to 
deliver its functional effects, no homologies are invoked across related species to explain 
how corresponding traits are inherited. Finally, no explanation is given of why the device 
or mechanism has been selected and reproduced. 
It is in reaction to this kind of broad causal-role (non-biological) view of mental 
function that Evolutionary Psychology has developed. The idea is to systematically 
identify the teleological condition (condition 3 above) that explains why an information-
processing disposition is present. In virtue of condition 3, a given psychological function 
exists if the specific informational pick-up and the computational transformation between 
input/output that it effects have been selected because they solve a specific adaptive 
problem. Where traditional views on the mind identify general-purpose, content-free 
mechanisms (« learning », « reasoning », « emoting », etc.), Evolutionary Psychologists 
claim that a specialized content – that which constitutes a specific « essential adaptation »  
- must organize the very design of an informational mechanism. This in turn suggests that a 
cognitive architecture has to be composed of many modules, each one having been selected 
to solve a specific adaptive problem.  
As Jerry Fodor defined the term (Fodor, 1983), a module is an informational 
processing device that automatically, quickly and effortlessly, transforms inputs of a 
domain into readily usable outputs. Modules however are « informationally encapsulated » 
in the sense that they use only the information available in their own domain of 
specialization (for example: visual or linguistic processing); they cannot modulate their 
outputs by using the various types of information stored in other modules. A common 
example of this informational encapsulation is offered by such robust perceptual 
phenomena as the Müller-Lyer illusion: this illusion persists even when the perceiver is 
aware that the two segments are in fact equal. Whereas Jerry Fodor took modules to be 
« peripheral » entities, delivering their outputs to a non-modular, central processing unit, 
Evolutionary Psychologists maintain that functional specialization extends right up into 
reasoning and other higher-level processes. This fully modular view of cognition, 
according to them, is the only way to solve the ‘ frame problem ’ that is, to bypass the 
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computational explosion that would paralyze a general-purpose system confronted with 
real-world complexity. Indeed a module is the evolutionary solution to combinatorial 
explosion as a general selection pressure. 
There are several ways of solving the frame problem: reducing the dimensionality of 
the problem situation can be achieved by using either domain specific algorithms, or non-
standard information-processing models. An alternative way – as we shall see below – is to 
show that the problem never actually arises for biological systems: it is only generated by 
an erroneous view of how these systems relate to their « informational » environment. On 
this alternative view, the brain imposes structure on its environment in a way that reduces 
its dimensionality. For Evolutionary Psychologists, the problem does arise, and dedicated 
computational modules are the multiple, but automatic, responses that evolution found to 
solve it. "Darwinian algorithms"or "cognitive programs"7 are automatically activated each 
time a certain recurrent adaptive problem is encountered. Given that there are many such 
problems, the mind encompasses many different modules, from cheater detection and mate 
selection, to food choice, habitat choice and theory of mind. 
A notorious difficulty with the notion of an evolutionary module is that of justifying 
the "adaptive high-resolution maps" of the various mechanisms that collectively constitute 
the mind. Three types of methods can be used to construct such maps. One is the "reverse-
engineering" approach: starting from the problems that our human ancestors had to deal 
with, find which precise cognitive programs would optimally respond to them. The second 
consists in testing the hypotheses formulated in this a priori way. The crux of the method 
consists in creating alternative experimental conditions, in which the distal "adaptive" 
dimensions of the task are made to compete with more proximal computational 
explanations of the observed performances. For example, if there is such a thing as a 
"cheater detection module" whose activity is elicited by a "social contract" situation, 
experiments will be designed to contrast performances when a detection of a rule violation 
is presented in a social contract garb, and in an abstract reasoning garb (as in the original 
Wason task). If one can experimentally show that performance is greatly facilitated in the 
"adaptive" presentation, and cannot be better explained by some other adaptation or by a 
general purpose capacity, then the case can be made for a task-specific module being 
active. A third kind of evidence makes use of neuropsychology and psychopathology: if 
double dissociations between, say, theory of mind, on the one hand, and cheater-detection 
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on the other, can be observed in brain-lesioned subjects or patients with autism (one kind 
of performance being maintained while the other is disturbed), then the hypothesis for 
there being (at least) two different specialized modules for social reasoning is comforted. 
Let us pause to consider what Evolutionary Psychology has to tell us about mental 
functions. First, the idea is that there are as many mental functions as there are specialized 
modules. Only some of them have been discovered, mostly those that correspond to the 
Fodorian peripheral modules. Evolutionary Psychology however suggests that all the 
modules that constitute our reasoning and decisional capacities use computational 
capacities in a contextual and parsimonious way. Therefore, old-fashioned psychology and 
neuroscience study only apparent functions: for the responses they describe do not fulfill 
the three conditions above. 1) They fail to identify the contextual, motivated or adaptive 
character of information processing. For example, people do not use a « mental logic » to 
detect rule violation; they use, rather, a faster and more frugal algorithm that bypasses 
modus tollens. 2) They don’t explain how this disposition is acquired and reproduced (it 
certainly is acquired neither through the teaching of logic, nor through innate logic). 3) 
They don’t explain how the disposition is there.  
To capture the level at which it is relevant to speak of a mental function, Evolutionary 
Psychologists rely on David’s Marr (1982) three-level distinction of a research agenda in 
cognitive science. The « computational theory » has to determine what the goal of the 
computation is. The level of the « algorithm » has to determine how the input, its 
transformations, and the output are represented. Finally, the hardware level has to 
determine how representations are implemented in the brain. By adopting this trichotomy, 
they choose to look at "mental function" from a functionalist viewpoint (this is not, 
appearance notwithstanding, a tautology: "functionalism" refers to a view of the mind 
according to which mental states are definable in terms of their causal-representational 
relations, independently of their cerebral realization). Mental function is taken to belong to 
the computational level: function has to do with the goal of a computation: the goal must 
be clear before we can look for the cognitive processes that subserve it. The "hardware" 
level, finally, has at most the role of providing additional, optional evidence for the 
existence of a function. This view of mental function has been very popular among 
philosophers and psychologists, and more generally among functionalists: if only the 
causal relations, captured in computational terms, between inputs and outputs are relevant 
in psychology, then a neuroscientific analysis of the particular way in which these 
computations are implemented is only of marginal interest. 
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Many objections have been leveled against Evolutionary Psychology, often inspired 
by a strong anti-biological view of human psychology. We need only consider here those 
objections that share the view that Evolution is relevant to understanding mental function. 
There are three main objections of this sort.8  
a– Methodology 
The first is methodological. Reverse engineering seems to bring back the worst forms 
of pan-adaptationism. Although some information processing mechanisms must have been 
selected for their effects, it is difficult to prove that the teleological condition 3 does apply 
in all the cases where an adaptation seems to be present. Some might be rather 
exaptations,9 or architectural consequences that have no direct teleological explanation. A 
currently controversial example is the computational apparatus underlying human 
language, in particular syntax. Hauser et al. (2002) suggested that syntax might have 
evolved for reasons other than language (like number use, navigation, social cognition). If 
such were the case, syntax would be an exaptation rather than an adaptation, in spite of the 
obviously useful effects of a language faculty in our species. Pinker & Jackendoff (2005) 
on the other hand, argue that the complexity of the interconnected mechanisms that syntax 
involves have the earmarks of adaptation, which suggests that syntax is an adaptation for 
communication. Another example is the possible functionality of postural synchronous 
sway among cooperative speakers10: although this sway might be adaptive to facilitate 
communication among participants, it might also be simply the exaptive effect of intrinsic 
rhythmic patterns in speech production. 
 It is furthermore not obvious that evolution of mental function would always 
proceed by finding and using the optimal design for solving an adaptive problem. How 
efficient a cognitive mechanism is, depends on various dimensions of the adaptive 
problem: centrality of impact (how well does it solve the problem given the mental 
                                                
8 For a general critical approach of Evolutionary Psychology, see Buller (2005) and 
Panksepp & Panksepp "(2000).  
9  An exaptation is an adaptation where the effect currently performed by the 
corresponding trait does not coincide with the effect explaining why the trait  was 
primarily selected. Exaptations, arguably, might still count as functions : although initially 
selected for effect A, they might now have effect B, which would explain the disposition of 
the corresponding structure to raise its bearer’s fitness and thus be passed on to offspring in 
the future. But usefulness of an exaptation does not automatically mean that it will actually 
be passed on : it may also have deleterious effects given the inclusive context in which the 
organism has to survive. 
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architecture in its previous design), tolerance for mishaps, temporal constraints, and 
proportion of cognitive resources that it recruits. Given the necessary trade-offs between 
these variables, it is to be expected that the hypothetical selected modules should often be 
sub-optimal in accuracy, while offering acceptable solutions given the time and effort 
saved. This objective fact however works in favor of overincluding behaviors among 
adaptations, which is a reason to exert caution in using this line of reasoning.  
 
b - Co-evolution 
Some adaptive changes in one species (for example: color pattern in birds) are such 
that they do not generate a major selective pressure on other species, nor directly affect the 
physical environment. This however does not seem to be the case for evolutionary changes 
that are driven by social environments, as is the case for human cognition. According to 
the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis, any increment in social predictive capacity is 
bound to have repercussions within and also beyond the species.11 In the primate group, 
social pressures have led to adaptations for representing and predicting representational 
and predictive capacities in others (which allowed a « theory of mind » to emerge). The 
technological and cultural capacities that humans have developed as a social species on the 
basis of their cognitive capacities have also been constantly transforming the physical 
environments in which they construct their niches, to such an extent that all the other biota 
and associated ecosystems have been more or less directly affected. These transformations 
to the environment constitute new pressures directed at more specific adaptations.  
This has led many theorists to conclude, as do Sterelny & Griffiths (1999)12 and Proust 
(2006), that there is no invariant environment to which the lineage is adapted. Change in 
group size, change in population structure, and change in available resources strongly 
modulate the adaptiveness of altruistic or Machiavellian dispositions in a way that may 
differ from individual to individual, according to the strategy implemented in the group at 
large.  Technologies of various kinds, as well as human cultural practices, also strongly 
affect the physical environment in which they have to survive and reproduce. If this is true, 
cognitive adaptations should be taken to accommodate an evolving rather than a stable 
environment. Mental function should accordingly not be taken to correspond to one 
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12 Pp. 328 sq. 
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recurrent adaptive and « essential » problem (cashed out in terms of stable social and 
physical configurations). It should rather be characterized as a set of capacities allowing the 
organism to cope with changing, largely unpredictable environments. 
 
c - Predictability & non-flexibility  
The switch from the evolution of mechanisms to the evolution of evolvability of 
mechanisms constitutes an a priori reason to doubt that modules might be an efficient 
response to social-cognitive pressures: algorithms specialized in dealing with others in such 
practical matters as resource sharing or mate choice would be rigid responses to a changing 
world, not flexible answers to ever changing social constraints. They would also be 
particularly vulnerable to exploitation by others, given that predictions are made easier when 
the information relied upon is modular and specialized. The only way to prevent rigidity and 
predictability would be to have many possible modular responses for any given situation. 
But in this case, some form of central control of the modular responses should be expected; 
we would lose automaticity and speed, and we would be confronted with the computational 
explosion that threatened the general learning account. 
In sum: Evolutionary Psychogy has interestingly tried to respond to the requirements 
that an informational device must fulfil to qualify as a mental function. 1) It explicitly aims 
to identify the relevant context in which a given informational process was selected. 2) It 
takes genetic transmission  to explain how 'Darwinian algorithms' are reproduced. 3) It 
accounts for the presence of these specialized informational processes by a historical-causal 
(i.e. 'etiological') application of teleological condition 3. Central objections however blame 
reverse engineering methodology; they pinpoint that the appropriate selective context might 
be characterized in dynamic rather than in factual/discrete terms.  Furthermore, they observe 
that there is presently no clear evidence that modules are genetically transmitted. Finally, the 
selection of shallow, fast and automatic modular processing seems to be incompatible with 






3 – Mental function: the developmental view and  "Evo-devo" biology 
13 
Several developmental approaches to evolution, in particular evo-devo and 
Developmental System Theory (DST), have generated important ideas that are crucial to our 
discussion of mental function(s).13 Evo-Devo is the field of evolutionary biology that 
examines how development has evolved under evolutionary pressures, and how it retroacts 
on evolution. One of the central concepts of this field is the concept of modularity, which 
turns out to be of critical importance to understand the basis of mental functions. 
Developmental system theorists on the other hand question the orthodox view – that genes 
control the progressive functional specialization of brain areas in interaction with the 
physical and the social environment –, a position that, according to them, takes mental 
functions to be predetermined in the genetic code.  For DST theorists, in contrast, genes are 
themselves in part controlled by a variety of epigenetic chemical processes such as the DNA 
methylation system. In addition, inheritance mechanisms are not exclusively genetic, but 
extend to a variety of chemical, cultural, behavioral and physical phenomena. 
For the proponents of a developmental approach, therefore, what counts as an adaptive 
problem cannot be read from ancestral environment alone; it can only be known from the 
structure of what they call the « developmental modules » that structure the growth of the 
organism under study. A developmental module is a "region of strong interaction in an 
interaction matrix" (Griffiths, to appear). Developmental modules do have causal effects on 
other modules (they allow differentiation to occur in neighboring parts); they have however 
a higher degree of internal interaction, which allows them to be viewed as independent 
building blocks in the development of an organism. The adaptiveness of such a modular 
development is similar to the adaptiveness attributed to mental modules: in a modular 
architecture, the effects of mutations are more local; thus their their disruptive effect is less 
likely to harm the whole developmental process. Although some of these mutations may be 
quite specific and apparently limited, the outcome however may be extremely important, in 
particular because of the hierarchical and temporal nature of the "developmental cascade".  
As Griffiths emphasizes, double dissociation is also a consequence of this modular 
developmental architecture: a developmental module can be identified on the basis of its 
being selectively impaired without the other modules being perturbed. 
 
Now why should a developmental module be more relevant to mental function than the 
mental modules identified by Evolutionary Psychology? The response is straightforward: 
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because developmental modules directly map the selection pressures. To understand how 
such a mapping is possible, and how the developmental modules finally connect with mental 
modules, it is necessary to come back to the circular causal process, in virtue of which 
niches are causally shaped by populations while also constituting causal constraints to which 
populations have to adapt. When a co-evolutionary process affects both a specific population 
and its ecological niche, each co-transforms the other, creating ever changing adaptive 
problems for the organisms living in that niche. Thus, if you want to identify the selective 
pressures, look at the developmental modules (e.g. look at how the cells develop, how they 
differentiate in cascade in interaction with the environment). The mental modules, those that 
express the stabilized, mature organism, cannot however be directly inferred from the 
interaction between the species and its environment. Mental modules are much more elusive 
functional entities, for they result from the conjunction of two factors. First, each organism 
has a specific developmental pattern resulting from the specific timing of its encounter with 
relevant events and properties. Second, every mind will be the outcome of an optimization 
of its informational processes in light of cost-benefit compromises. For example, the degree 
of granularity that categorization reaches within a domain will depend on past affordances 
and individual training. There is no « general » environment with normal affordances and 
normal training procedures. Variation is the rule. 
Griffiths and Sterelny thus blame the Evolutionary Psychologists for their lack of 
sensitivity to what they call the « grain » problem. Let us take an example. What is the level 
of specialization of a given cognitive program, such as the « cheater detection program » 
studied by Cosmides and Tooby: Is it designed to detect a cheater? Is it designed to be more 
emotionally engaged in a task when the risk of a social contract violation is present?  Is it to 
memorize learnt rules when they are more salient? Evolutionary Psychologists claim that a 
mental function is a unique solution to one independent pressure; reverse engineering is 
able, starting from the problem, to derive the cognitive mechanisms subserving it. Such a 
method is indeed successfully applied in the case of morphological traits: the stability of the 
relevant selective pressures and the obvious relation, for example, between bone length, gait 
and body mass may allow one to form precise functional claims. In the case of 
psychological mechanisms, however, there is no a priori indication of the correct grain size.  
Only a developmental approach, however, can tell what is dissociable as a separate task; 
furthermore, the individual’s specific interaction with the environment and the ensuing 
learning process are what determine his resulting psychological organization – i.e. the task- 
and environment-dependent connections between informational processes that prevail for 
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that individual. For that reason Paul Griffiths (to appear) takes mental functions to consist 
neither of ‘virtual modules’, which need not coincide with development, nor, as we will see, 
with neuronal modules. This notion of « virtuality » is important, in that it points to the fact 
that mental function is associated with a kind of replication that cannot be described 
independently of the context of development.  
 
The case for homologies: a tension between two requirements? 
DST theorists as well as philosophers of biology14 have emphasized that homologies 
should play an essential role in determining biological functions in general, and mental 
functions in particular. In contrast with analogies, homologies characterize structures, which 
are similar inside phyla because of a shared ancestry (analogies exist between structures that 
are similar across phyla, without a shared ancestry).  In order to justify the existence of a 
given function,  as many biologists have argued, it is not sufficient to cite a causal link 
between an adaptive problem and a specialized mechanism; it is also necessary to show that 
the trait under consideration – the computational mechanism controlling the adaptive 
behavior – is the result of descent from earlier adaptations. This was, indeed, one of the 
main messages of Lorenz  and Tinbergen’s ethological view of function: a comparative 
approach is necessary to justify an evolutionary explanation of current behavior.  
More recently, authors of different obediences, such as Griffiths (1997), Matthen (2000) 
or Panksepp & Panksepp (2000), have used, in arguing against Evolutionary Psychology, the  
role of homologies within cladistic reasoning: “functional classifications can be used to 
group cladistic units together in a way that allows the theorist to express generalizations 
about the evolutionary process that apply to many different lineages”  (Griffiths, 1997, p. 
217). Homologies are indeed helpful for two basic reasons. First, they allow us to trace back 
how a structure has evolved along a phylum, from precursor to new forms.  This allows us to 
make function attributions that are more strongly rooted in the organism’s anatomy and in 
the fact that the trait was transmitted because of the additional fitness it conferred on its 
bearer. Second, they allow comparisons that are not based merely on superficial similarities 
in behavior; for example, if there is homologous brain circuitry that is activated for fear in 
macaques and in human beings, there is a prima facie strong reason to say that this circuit 
globally has the function of helping the system to detect and respond to danger; this even 
allows us to make precise hypotheses about the kind of danger to which the circuitry most 
                                                
14 Griffiths, (in press) ; see also Amundson & Lauder (1994).  
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efficiently responds (snakes, predators etc.).   When no such cerebral homologies are at 
hand, we are in no position to establish that two analogous behaviors have one and the same 
function – that is, have been selected because of the particular response they allow, and on 
the increased bearers’ fitness that ensues. 
In the case of human psychological functions, homologies have recently played a major 
role in functional reasoning. For example, although only human beings have linguistic 
competence, it has been shown that there is a homology between premotor area F5 in 
monkeys and Broca’s area (Brodmann’s areas 44 and 45) in humans  (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 
1998). These areas contain assemblies of neurons that are activated in primates both for 
executing and simulating manual actions and facial gestures (a “mirror-system” for action), 
while Broca’s area is involved in phonetic, syntactic and semantic language processing. This 
homology certainly does not show that monkeys can or could speak, given adequate 
training; but it suggests that the mirror-system might be a crucial pre-adaptation of language; 
the “missing link” between primate non-speaking communicators and human speakers might 
thus consist in an extension of the mirror system, linking it to exclusively human imitative 
abilities. An action proto-language might have emerged in humans, according to this 
reasoning, as a capacity for syntactically combining semantically interpreted manual 
gestures – a capacity implemented in Broca’s area (Roy & Arbib, 2005). Although mirror 
neurons were not originally “meant” (selected) to be used in communication, they might 
have later become a crucial piece of proto-language production and understanding. This 
example shows that homologies can be used to understand the evolutionary lineage of an 
adaptation within a phylum – rather than simply helping dissociate mental functions by 
distinguishing their underlying neuronal realizations.  
To summarize, the requirement of finding homologies in function attribution, seems to 
entail that psychological functions should fail to be identifiable when no homological brain 
structure is. Condition 2 in our definition of function is here becoming more central that 
condition 3. Griffiths also maintain, however, that psychological functions may include 
“virtual modules”, that is: dissociable patterns of performance that do not correspond 
uniquely to separate neuronal systems. If some or most psychological functions are such 
“competence patterns”, which are shaped by the demands of the current developmental 
environment rather than by an inherited brain anatomy, it is not clear why we should retain 
the homology requirement in psychology. If flexibility and plasticity prevail in the mental, it 
might seem that psychological functions do not have to be identified with inherited 
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anatomo-physiological structures.  The theoretician’s burden, in this case, is to give 
substance to the inheritance condition 2 on function in non-structural terms. 
 
The ambiguity of what is called a function 
 
The preceding discussion brings again to the fore the ambiguity that plagues most uses 
of the expression “ mental function”. In current terminology,  “neuronal systems” refer to 
anatomically specified  task-specific activations of neuronal assemblies. The very existence 
of these neuronal systems seems to most theorists to offer a sufficient guide to mental 
function.  It is common parlance to discuss “the” functions of “the mirror system”, of the 
“dorsal stream” of perceptual processing, or the role of the amygdala in processing 
emotional information in perceived faces etc. But the problem here is twofold. First, it is not 
obvious that what is identified as a causal role (as revealed by a systematic task-specific 
pattern of activation in the adult brain) actually corresponds to a mental function as defined 
by condition 3. What is reflected in brain imagery may not be carving out ‘a ’ function: it 
may in fact express either one or several functions (as called for by the particular task), one 
or several “exaptations”, or simply stabilized interactions between brain, culture and 
physical environment that do not have a function in the defined sense (without being 
inherited capacities- being there because they have this particular effect).  
Conversely, what should lead us to expect that bona fide mental functions necessarily 
correspond to the activity of dissociable, separate neuronal systems? If Griffiths is right to 
think that virtual modules do not have to be associated with a fixed neuronal substrate, then 
mental functions “in the strict sense”  might be realized by one cerebral substrate or another 
across subjects, according to the circumstances of their development – where developmental 
timing pattern, specific early training, injury, or local cultural habits, might play an essential 
role. Perhaps, in other words, the apparent neuronal fixity of modules is an effect of 
cultural/environmental homogeneity rather than a solid fact about the brain. If these 
reflections are on the right track, then the discussion of homology for mental function might 
have to be upgraded to a higher-order architectural level. We should not expect to find 
lineages of strictly dedicated, task-specific zones, but rather very general domains, such as 
emotional areas, versus spatial, instrumental, and episodic knowledge areas and the effects 
of their action, none of which can function independently of the others. The notion of a 
virtual psychological module is thus perfectly compatible with the view that the whole brain 
constitutes the only neuronal module there is. 
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4 - Mental function: the Neuronal growth approach 
 
We saw above that Evolutionary Psychologists have used Marr’s trichotomy in such a 
way that mental function turns out to be dissociable from brain development, physiology 
and anatomy. Many biologists and DST theories, however, have objected that homologies 
have to be present for sound functional attribution: they are the biological earmarks of 
functional structures. Fortunately, a solution to the homology puzzle is in view.  Powerful 
new ideas on the structural homologies subserving mental functions have emerged in the last 
few decades from the neurosciences, which come surprisingly close to the theoretical 
intuitions of the DST theorists – although no clear explicit cross-influence is noticeable in 
the respective literatures: the mind is built from the developing brain; the dynamics of the 
brain can only be understood against the background of the dynamics of the organism’s 
environment; neuronal growth is the key to understanding why certain forms of brain 
activity are selected for their effects.  
A major difference in accommodating these ideas, however, concerns the respective 
roles of learning and of brain dynamics. For “neural constructivism”,15 learning is what 
guides brain growth: learning induces changes in the brain structures involved in learning. 
For neural selectionism (also called brain Darwinism), the reverse is true: brain development 
drives learning, by the neuronal competition and selection that it generates.  Before coming 
back to this important difference, let us introduce and comment further shared intuitions on 
mental function among neurocognitive theories.  
For both theories, the brain is a “representational device”  (representation here being 
taken to mean that the brain states are correlated with other states and properties, about 
which they carry information). It is widely recognized that representational development in 
ontogeny is characterized by “U shape” patterns.  Children begin by performing well on 
some task, then they typically undergo a period of failure, by overgeneralizing their earlier 
knowledge, until they finally come up with a new stable, more robust, and extensive 
ability.16 This phenomenon points to the fact that the brain is nonstationary - its statistical 
properties vary with time. Both theories agree that this nonstationary character deeply 
affects the ways we should think about mental properties, for the structures underlying 
                                                
15 Karmiloff-Smith (1992), Thelen & Smith (1994), Quartz & Sejnowski (1997), 
Christensen & Hooker, (2000). 
16 For precisely documented examples, see Karmiloff-Smith (1992). 
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acquisition themselves change over time.  Later representational stages are not simply 
refinements of earlier stages, but involve large-scale reorganizations as a consequence of 
structural changes in the learning mechanisms. Both reject the functionalist interpretation of 
Marr’s trichotomy. Both see the brain as using feedback to regulate its own development. 
Finally, and crucially, both claim that the cerebral vehicle of mental function is dynamically 
shaped by the very process that allows mental function to emerge, and according to a set of 
mechanisms that are “meant to” - i.e. shaped by evolution in order to - let that function 
emerge. In other words, the functional analysis that allows us to understand mental function 
is referred to the neural vehicle that implements mental activity. This does not constitute a 
“change of level”, as the authors take it that cognition is actually developing at the cell level 
and across neural populations: dendrite segments and dendrite structure are carrying 
information; the architecture of cognition can therefore only be understood through the 
architecture of the developing brain. This claim is a major breakthrough in theorizing about 
mental function, a breakthrough that needs to be explored in all its consequences.  
The traditional genetic explanations of brain function, as we saw above, assume the 
brain to be “genetically informed” of the general kind of environment it is going to be living 
in. Further gene-environment interaction in epigenesis is supposed to fine-tune adaptation. 
In contrast with this view, the neurocognitive theorists are claiming that the brain has the 
disposition to be dynamically shaped to allow survival in a changing world. The genes work 
by biasing the brain/world interaction early in development, and not – or not only17 – by 
conveying information about which rules or algorithms to apply. The maturational program 
coded by genes now works only or mainly as a biasing factor: it leads certain areas of the 
developing brain to be sensitive to particular kinds of inputs.  
 In both theories, although they may not express their results this way, the intrinsically 
dynamic, (and, as I will argue later, teleological) form that results from developmental 
brain/world interaction is that of a hierarchy of adaptive control loops. In other terms, the 
neurocognitive theories reject the distinction between a cognitive and an implementation 
level because the very same type of mechanisms (generate and test procedures, for the 
selectionist, or “constructive”, that is, environment-controlled growth, for the neural 
constructivist) characterize the development of cognitive learning and of the growth or 
                                                
17 As we shall see below, some selectionists recognize that genes might make available an 
initial repertoire of dedicated processes, on which selection will suppress the non-relevant 
ones.  
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selection of neuronal cells. This latter point is very important, and needs to be discussed in 
more depth in each theory. 
 
Selectionism : “ a radically new view of the function of the brain”(Edelman, 1987) 
 
The selectionist theories, introduced by Edelman (1987) and Changeux & Dehaene 
(1989), adamantly reject the idea that mental function could fail to correspond to neural 
organization. Changeux & Dehaene (1989) suggest, rather, reinterpreting Marr’s trichotomy 
so that it refers to different organization levels within the nervous system. The most basic 
architectural level they describe is the single cell level, with a functional diffentiation of the 
axon, dendrite and synapse.  At that level, the function of the neuron can already be deemed 
‘cognitive ’: it is to transform input into output, in virtue of specific patterns of electrical and 
chemical properties that carry information. A single neuron is already performing a 
computational task (the program level); it is following an algorithmic process, and does so 
according to specific physical properties (molecular properties of the synapse and of the 
membrane). There is therefore no “ontological” autonomy of any one task-level, as 
functionalists claim, but a relation of “co-dependence” among levels. The constraints of the 
synapse and the membrane determine, in part, which computations can be performed, as 
well as which kind of goal they can serve. Reciprocally, serving a goal modulates both the 
computational and the physical levels, and helps stabilize the physical properties of the cell. 
A second anatomical layer encompasses “circuits”, i.e. neuronal assemblies of thousands of 
cells organized in well-defined structures, i.e. presenting task-dependent synchronous 
firings. A third layer is constituted by the “metacircuits”, i.e. relations of neuronal 
assemblies. Finally the traditional mental faculties are taken to roughly correspond to 
various of these metacircuits. 
Functional agnostics will be quick to ask how such an organization emerges in the first 
place. The response is that a recurrent two-phase process is responsible for brain 
organization and learning. An initial exuberant growth of neural structure, leading to an 
overproduction of synapses, is followed by a selective pruning back of connections. There 
are successive waves of this sort of growth and selection from birth to puberty, each wave 
presenting in succession “transient redundancy and selective stabilization” . “One has the 
impression, writes Changeux, that the system becomes more and more ordered as it receives 
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‘instructions’ from the environment.” 18 This impression, in the author’s view, is justified; 
indeed the function of the brain comes down to that: stabilizing those dynamic patterns that 
have high predictive value, while suppressing those that have low value given the 
environment in which development is taking place. 
In summary: learning occurs by selection (as a consequence of brain/world 
interactions), but only if neurons and their synaptic connections already exist. This 
succession is objectively justified by the fact that learning presupposes selection. Bouts of 
learning can accordingly be analyzed, as the authors claim, through some version or other of 
Herbert Simon’s “generate and test”  procedure. Neural proliferation produces variety; 
neural pruning selects those variants that have been more often activated through feedback 
from the environment (by suppressing their less successful competitors). Transitions 
between levels of organization result from a generalized and hierarchical stabilizing effect of 
“generate and test”  procedures with re-entrant feedback loops within larger populations of 
neurons.  
The most striking aspect of this theory, from a philosophical point of view, is that a 
 “causal-teleological” explanation of adaptation, goal or function, is now taken to be 
common to the phylogenetic evolution of the brain, to developmental (ontogenetic) 
evolution, to the workings of the mature brain, and implicitly (as we will show below) to the 
representations that the brain structures carry. “An analogous Darwinian scheme” as 
Changeux & Dehaene (1989) put it,  is at work within the brain as it is within evolution at 
large: brain structures have evolved neural growth/learning processes that mimic the 




This alternative theory takes its inspiration from Piaget’s constructivism, i.e. the view 
that mental representations are constructed through an action-guided, ongoing internalization 
of environmental structures. As we saw above, careful observation of human ontogeny 
shows that learning in each domain is highly discontinuous. Neural constructivists explain 
the dynamics of learning in development by a progressive growth of dendrites according to 
the interaction of the brain with perceptual input (in each modality: visual, auditory, 
proprioceptive, etc.). The fundamental differences with selectionism involve two claims: 1) 
                                                
18 Changeux (1985), p. 249. 
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that dendrite growth (and diversity) is exclusively controlled by the environment, rather than 
dually by endogenous and exogenous influences; 19 2) that the immature cortex is taken to 
be initially equipotent (as brain damage in early development has little or no detrimental 
effect on mental function). Evidence from brain plasticity suggests that brain function is, as 
we saw above, a matter of general evolvability rather than of specialized adaptations.  For 
neural constructivism, the actual functional organization of the mature brain depends 
entirely on the external constraints that the brain needs to learn: “It is the differing pattern of 
afferent activity, reflective of different sensory modalities, that confers area-specific 
properties onto the cortex – not predispositions that are somehow embedded in the recipient 
cortical structure”.20 
As a consequence of claims 1 and 2, neural suppression plays only a minor role in brain 
development. The structuring force consists rather in the creating of neural connections 
under the influence of incoming data/stimuli. The mechanisms that are hypothesized to 
generate brain tissue growth and, more specifically, dendritic arborization, seem to involve 
local releases of neurotrophins, i.e. feedback signals that are delivered post-synaptically and 
are thus activity-dependent signals.21 As a consequence of these constructive, bottom-up 
mechanisms, the cortex is “enslaved” , that is, fully controlled, by the periphery. Mental 
function thus consists primarily in “enslavability”: it involves the production of flexible, 
adapted responses to varying environmental constraints as well as to changing body size. As 
in the selectionist model, the constructive model associates mental function with a 
hierarchical brain architecture; hierarchical representations result from cascades of 
environmental constructivist influences working from cells to assemblies onto circuits, thus 
building representations of increasing complexity.22  
Constructivists however are more insistent than selectionists in considering that mental 
function can only be understood as the particular (and somehow contingent) outcome of 
development.  In their view, domain-specific competences of the Darwinian algorithm type 
                                                
19 Given that dendrites have non –linear properties, individual dendritic segments could be 
the brain’s "basic computational units". Quartz & Sejnowski (1997), p. 549. 
20 Quartz & Sejnowski (1997), p. 552. 
21 For a clear analysis of these mechanisms in the visual cortex, see Katz & Shatz, 1996. 
22 Ibid. p. 550. Several interesting principles are used to explain the mature brain’s 
functional organization ; one is the so-called "geometric principle" through which 
information is collected in a topological way, spatially or conceptually related 
representations being realized in neighboring physical structures ; the other is the 
"clustering" principle, through which related inputs onto dendritic segments result in a 
pattern of termination that mirrors the informational structure of the input. (ibid, p. 549) 
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(cheater detection, snake detection, etc.) can be seen as evolved “mental functions” only if 
one forgets the whole developmental process that generated them. Actually, they are the 
result of repeated processing of initially domain-general mechanisms, which have turned out 
to be more often used for specific inputs: domain-relevant mechanisms are thus 
progressively turned into domain-specific mechanisms, as a result of their particular 
developmental history  (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).  
In summary, we see that although the two neurocognitive theories under review are 
similarly focusing on the dynamics of development and its cascading effects on brain 
structure and function, they have symmetrical views on the relations of brain and 
environment. Selectionists see the brain as imposing structure, through its own innate 
“biasing” agenda, on an unstructured world. Neural constructivists reciprocally see the 
world as enslaving the brain by imposing on it spatio-temporal patterns of reactivity and sets 
of representations.  
The variety and complexity of the brain processes engaged in learning suggest, 
however, that the two views might in fact have to coalesce into some encompassing 
“hybrid” theory: regressive and constructive mechanisms might in fact concurrently be 
engaged in development -- even though, existing evidence can still be argued to favor one 
camp over the other.23  
 
To conclude this section, it may be helpful to summarize the preceding discussion in 
terms of our analysis of function (see section 1). Concerning condition 1, i.e. an existing 
disposition (or a set of dispositions) that can be copied or reproduced such that having it 
would allow a system to develop capacities of a mental type: neurocognitivists answer that it 
is the disposition of the brain to grow in a way that is sensitive to its developmental 
environment (more exactly, to the computational demands that it involves). Note that this 
description of the brain disposition itself includes embedded functions: for example 
development is itself selected for, and may therefore also evolve as such, which in turn will 
affect the very disposition of the brain to structure itself. The strength of the neurocognitive 
proposal for mental function, as compared to modular views, is that the general constraints 
that exert pressures on brain evolution are made fully explicit in the model. The external 
constraints are the environmental conditions that differentially affect neural growth; the 
internal constraints are represented by the set of existing neural assemblies and their 
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interconnections that allow the brain to grow in ways that are in part predetermined by the 
existing circuits and metacircuits.  Condition 2, which concerns the processes that are used 
to reproduce the disposition in other organisms,  is dually constituted by genetic 
reproduction and by the mechanisms that allow stabilization of the environment through 
human intervention. Finally, condition 3 posits that the consequences of the disposition to 
regulate brain growth is correlated with a capacity to extract information and process it in 
the way that is the most flexible given the overall external and internal constraints, and has 
been selected because of this correlation. These theories therefore see mental function as a 
progressively differentiated, but initially global, capacity to store previous dynamics in 
existing brain matter in order to predict the environment and to adjust to it. In a currently 
fashionable style, one could say that the distal function of the brain is to orient its growth so 
as to   “resonate to” the environment - or to be “dynamically coupled” with it in a flexible 
way. We will elaborate this view in the final section. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
23 Katz & Shatz, 1996, p. 1137, Hurford et al. (1997), p. 567, Dehaene-Lambertz & 
Dehaene (1997). 
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5 – Mental function or functions? 
 
The mental representations that are built as an outcome of (creative or regressive) neural 
growth have a set of functional properties that are necessary ingredients of a working mind.  I 
call these properties “functional” because they are entailed by the distal function of the brain that 
was just spelled out. As a consequence of the selectionist/constructivist model, these 
representations must be predictive, recombinable, modifiable, robust, and have a 
descriptive/conative polarity. We will first examine each of these features in order to see which 
cognitive capacities or developmental constraints refer to them. We will then be in a position to 
approach a more speculative question: How does recognition of these functional dimensions 
affect our view concerning how many mental functions there are ? 
 
a) Predictability is an outcome of the control structure of the developing brain. 
Representations are predictive, in the sense that the feedback used to construct a 
representation corresponds to a state of the world whose temporal properties are context-
relativized. In other words, the brain takes advantage of the contextual cues to predict 
what comes next in a structured way (keeping track of perceptual cues as well as temporal 
sequence to reach probabilistically reliable predictions). For example, in an ordinary 
human environment, meals occur as a succession of routines with a certain dynamic 
pattern. The brain needs only store a small set of cues to know that it will soon be time for 
lunch. 
b) Representations can be recombined in ways that tend to be less and less specialized 
with development, in virtue of the very capacity of the mind/brain, as a dynamic system, 
to generalize knowledge acquired in a specific domain.24  
c) Modifiability is also a result of the constant re-evaluation of acquired informational 
structures  through feedback. Flexibility applies both to learning procedures (during 
development) and to thought contents (throughout life): both are adjusted, monitored and 
reorganized in a self-organizing way.  Representational flexibility, however, should occur 
in a differential way, constrained as it is by generative entrenchment; this differential 
flexibility is in keeping with the fact that a representational system, such as a brain, is a 
nonstationary system with time dependent-properties.  
                                                
24 Some of the mechanisms allowing such a capacity to emerge from brain structure are 
described in programmatic terms in Quartz & Sejnowski (1997). 
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d) Robustness is a necessary feature of representational stability in a dynamic world.25 In 
genetics, mutational robustness refers to an organism's phenotype remaining constant in 
spite of mutation. By analogy, representational robustness is a property of representations 
and representation systems in virtue of which they preserve a stable core in spite of being 
transmitted or generalized to new contexts, or in spite of contextual change. This property 
of robustness is of major architectural significance given, again, the role of potentially 
varying, unstable feedback in neural growth. Although as we have seen, learning how to 
learn is a crucial adaptation to changing environments, the environment in which learning 
occurs may also be customized to regulate robustness, and lead to a form of environmental 
selection comparable to niche selection in evolutionary biology.  
Two sources of feedback-induced robustness come to mind. One consists in using the 
body and its own dynamics as a general model for other dynamic phenomena. Bodily motions 
can be used as a way of representing dynamically social as well as non-social events through 
overt or covert simulations.26 Bodily gestures, such as pointing in joint attention, can be used 
to reduce noise in communication; they can also facilitate recall as well as thinking 
(considerable bodily information goes to structuring “abstract”  linguistic symbols).27  The 
other consists in using the social and physical environment as an external device to shape 
children’s development. For development to occur,  there must be, as Lev Vygostky and later 
Jerome Brunner insisted,  a process of scaffolding through which a child is guided by parents 
and teachers, allowing him/her to move forward into a zone of proximal development that the 
child could not reach alone.28 An efficient scaffolding is one that optimizes the "fit" between 
the informational content being transmitted (a skill or  piece of knowledge) and the cognitive 
properties of the receiving mind. The scaffolding may include, besides the "executive control" 
of an adult mind, a timely and sufficiently attractive presentation of the task, as well as spatial 
and sensorimotor cues that allow multiple representation of the problem space. This latter 
"fit" is regulated in turn by another selection/creation process that applies socially to 
representations. This process creates what Dan Sperber calls "cultural cognitive causal 
chains".29  
Bodily postures, ways of moving as culturally shaped, as well as cognitively adapted 
environments are therefore also selected and maintained in dynamic coupling with 
                                                
25 On the biological importance of robustness, see Hammerstein et al. (2006). 
26 See Proust (2006b). 
27 See Barsalou, (1999). 
28 See Vygostky, 1978, Ch. 6. 
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representational systems (each stabilizing the other). They contribute to a considerable degree 
to representational robustness. This kind of co-evolution might help explain why there are 
cultural invariants, such as  folk-biology, folk-pychology, or religion: the representations that 
prevail in the socially constructed mind/brain are those that are easier to acquire and transmit, 
and that fit more snugly the various emotional/motivational demands of the developing brain. 
Reciprocally, the social environments and bodily practices that allow an easier grasp 
(perceptual and cognitive) of the associated representations should evolve under the renewed 
demands of mind/brains that have depended, for their development, on those environments. 
In sum, the brain needs a culture to grow into an organized semistable structure, much as 
its cells need oxygen to survive. Pace Evolutionary Psychologists, however, the existence of 
cultural universals – such as folk biology or folk psychology – does not necessarily point to 
an innate, genetically predetermined modular organization; these can also be explained in 
terms of the brain’s permanent activity – cognitively resonating to a social/biological/physical 
environment possessing globally similar constraints.  
 
e) Conative-descriptive polarity is an architectural requirement that any cognitive organism 
has to fulfill : it must deal with information in two complementary ways –extract it, in 
perception, and use it, in action. In neurocognitive models, this polarity is already 
implemented  at the cell level, each neural cell receiving input and producing a response – 
(graded) firing or no firing - according to the input. Motor behavior is the organism-level 
response through which adequate coupling with the environment is performed in a flexible 
and integrated way (momentary needs are integrated into a single goal-oriented behavior at 
a time). In human cognition, the higher level at which this polarity controls behavior is the 
prefrontal cortex level. This structure is a highly adaptable structure that is constantly 
configuring the system to address current concerns, taking into consideration various time-
dependent constraints.30 
 
We are at last in a position to offer an answer to our question: how does this analysis of 
mental function accommodate traditional notions such as the five faculties  (perception, action, 
memory, affect-desire, reasoning) or the more recent distinction between selective attention, 
perception, working, semantic, and episodic memories, planning and action, emotion etc. ? If the 
function of the brain is to ensure a cognitive dynamic coupling with its environment, driven by 
                                                                                                                                              
29 See Sperber, (2006). 
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inputs and biased by innate motivations, is it still biologically justified to distinguish separate 
mental functions according to their causal roles? 
A conservative response would defend the view that a simple rational task analysis of what 
the brain needs to accomplish (i.e. develop into a flexibly learning, sensitive organ able to 
control behavior) shows how justified the old wisdom was. Information has to be picked up 
(perception), retained (memory), and it has to be used (action), in a way that is context sensitive 
(motivation/emotion) and able to combine inferentially with existing knowledge (reasoning). It 
cannot be disputed that even though these venerable divisions of the mind turn out to be 
theoretically ill-grounded, they might be practically valuable in allowing research to develop 
when no principled explanation of mental function is available - or is consensual enough to 
organize research. 
 A more speculative and daring view, one that the developmental approach and the 
neurocognitive models of brain growth have made plausible, is that it is far from obvious that the 
brain is structured into separate, anatomically distinct faculties of the kind proposed. Multi-
reentrant loops dynamically connect perceptual areas with motor areas, memory, and emotion 
sites. Any task has to cut across all of the "faculties", and will foster further development of their 
interconnectedness; such interconnectedness constitutes what learning that task consists in. To 
know how to do X, you must do more than "simply remember" - a capacity that would involve a 
pure form of “procedural memory” – you must also evaluate the benefit (a subcortical 
achievement), you must have perceptual access to X-related objects, and your brain must have 
some somatic experience corresponding to how it feels to do X. Performance in action is thus 
constantly modulated by motivation and emotion as well as by perceptual input and memory, and 
actually every such contribution is closely associated with others, either by cortical or subcortical 
connections. Vision psychologists acknowledge that perceiving involves acting with the eyes: 
muscles regulate vision, and retinas perform saccades that explore the relevant parts of objects of 
interest. Reciprocally, action psychologists acknowledge that action is constrained by the visual 
or the auditory spatial properties of the effect of the action (Simon effect), not to mention the 
essential role of perceptual feedback in the control of action. This functional connectedness 
suggests that the attempt at treating the traditional faculties as distinct mental functions is not 
biologically justified.31   
                                                                                                                                              
30 See Duncan (2001) & Koechlin & al., (2003). 
31   The stronger view of mental function that this article tries to elaborate does not deny 
that neuro-anatomical similarity across individuals and relative domain specificity in 
information processing make  the modular idiom useful in certain respects. What  it denies 
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An additional argument for a global and dynamic notion of mental function comes from 
pathology. Contrary to the traditional faculties model, it is not the case that blind subjects are 
those whose eyes are lost, that mad people are those whose reason is perturbed, that aboulic 
people are those that cannot act etc. In fact, what cognitive pathology has been showing is that 
there is no such thing as a “mental dysfunction” that would coincide nicely with the impairment 
of a brain structure and its associated hypothetical role; impairments rather affect subjects in 
many different ways, suggesting that the traditional syndromes are only phenotypically similar 
but in fact causally complex.32 Far from justifying the existence of these separate but 
collaborative functions, pathology reveals the importance of development timing, and interaction 
between early acquisitions and motivation in organizing the adult competences (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1998). Furthermore, as recent research on Williams Syndrome and autism has shown, 
different subjects may use completely different strategies to solve the same problem or perform 
the same cognitive task. For a theory of mind task, for example, some subjects rely more on their 
semantic memory, some on perceptual cues, some on instrumental reasoning. These various 
strategies were presumably selected as a consequence of the particular pattern of plasticity that 
their developing brain has been settling into, given the genetic or environmental constraints it 
had to face. (Karmiloff-Smith, 2006) 
 
If, as we want to claim, adaptive control is the general “mechanism” or rather, type of 
mechanism, that characterizes mental function,33 an evolved causal mechanism that shapes brain 
growth as well as genetic expression, representational selection and propagation of culture, then 
we need to look at mental functions as either additional adaptations or exaptations to adaptive 
control. Kim Sterelny (Sterelny, 2003) for example has suggested that mental skills are 
specifically meant to cope with what Sterelny calls "informational translucency", a property of 
                                                                                                                                              
is that these modules are shaped by evolution as the conditions 1-3 above specify. If, as we 
argued above, the brain is developing in response to a changing environment, and function 
is determined by developmental constraints and environmental demands, our definition of 
a mental function cannot mistake a given token or  type of functional effect (the one that is 
observed given a social-historical developmental context), with the general function of 
adaptive control that it exemplifies in that particular dynamic context. This also suggests 
that interpreting psychopathology is more difficult than commonly acknowledged; the 
distinction between impairment and compensation, for example, is difficult to draw in the 
absence of an independent understanding of the mental function(s) (in this broad, dynamic 
sense of the term), that is supposed to be perturbed. I thank Dick Carter for critical 
observations associated to this point. 
32 For the functional analysis of schizophrenia, as a good illustration of this point, see 
Proust (2006a). 
30 
social or physical environments in which the cues are less reliable or can be manipulated by 
predators. In such environments, there is a cost in mining information (because of the risks 
incurred in exploring the presence or value of the cues) and/or in acting on it (when the cues are 
not reliable, the action becomes ineffective). In such contexts, it becomes important to devise 
strategies not only for reaching external goals, but also for extracting and using information. One 
of the most important functions of human culture is to help young organisms acquire the capacity 
to assess informational quality and to restore transparency whenever it is possible and useful to 
do so (by changing either the internal or external environments).34 Sterelny explains robust 
multi-modal cueing and representation decoupling (allowing separate storage of alternative, 
incompatible representations of the same kind of situation35) as responding to such pressures. Do 
these skills represent new cognitive functions? In Sterelny’s view, these skills have rather to be 
analyzed as domain-general responses elaborated through culture. The idea of a “cumulatively 
engineered epistemic environment” refers to the view that the educational or imitative 
procedures that characterize our human cultures are designed to allow individuals to acquire 
“entrenched skills”. Given that such skills are a product of learning provided with what we 
earlier called “scaffolding”, it is arguable that they do not constitute additional cognitive 
“functions”; they are rather the expression of how the brain preserves representational robustness 
in uncertain or socially demanding contexts. 
In Proust (2006b and in print), I suggested that another important dimension of robustness 
consists in predicting one’s own capacity to predict. Higher level prediction defines 
metacognition, a control process that is endogeneously applied to the brain’s predictive self-
evaluative processes.  This second order prediction has been studied in metamemory, a field of 
interest to teachers; more recently, its importance has been discovered for neuroeconomics, 
where predictive valuation processes are made to apply to the value of predictors of rewards. 
Should metacognition be taken to represent a distinct mental function? I would want to claim, 
rather, that the associated skills point to dimensions of adaptive-predictive control systems that 
are inherent to mental architecture. They are not separate functions, but constitutive aspects of 
this overarching, uniquely adaptive, predictive, “dynamic coupling” function of animal minds of 
a given complexity. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
33 For a similar view on cognitive function, see Christensen  & Tommasi (2006) 
34 These constraints are analyzed in more detail for their consequences on the architecture 
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